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I Introduction
In 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev, in near des-
peration, prevailed upon Chancellor Helmut Kohl
to persuade reluctant German banks to lend money
to the USSR. At the time, international banks were
not only reducing the supply of fresh credits to that
country but refusing to renew its short-term cred-
its as they matured. After several months of argu-
ment, the chancellor eventually persuaded his
country's banks to grant a DM5 billion (US$3 bil-
lion) loan to the USSR in the third quarter of 1990,
under a German government guarantee. Its pur-
pose was to pay for imports of consumer goods and
help finance the USSR's trade deficit (Lines 1990;
UNECE 1991: 95).
In 1997, after five years of economic liberalisation
and reform in Russia, President Boris Yeltsin's gov-
ernment persuaded first (in June) the private US
financier George Soros and then (in November)
Western banks to provide in total more than US$1
billion in short-term loans to help the government
pay off arrears in pension payments and wages.
Chancellor Kohl was also asked for assistance with
this (Economist, 6 December 1997; Financial
Times, 5 March 1998).
The coincidence of these acts provides an apt sym-
bol of the effectiveness of reform in the Russian
economy since the USSR collapsed. The broad lines
of failure in the reform effort are well known: an
economy which has virtually halved in size and
where criminal elements have gained an inextrica-
ble hold at all levels of activity. That big story has
been examined exhaustively elsewhere. This article
aims to examine only certain central features of the
economy, through which the government has con-
ducted much of its policy: money and prices at the
very centre, and closely associated with them, the
financial system, especially banking. The remain-
ing three sections discuss: monetary developments
since 1992; the failure of a reform policy based on
monetary stabilisation; and the lessons that can be
drawn from this for the transition generally.
The author is grateful for valuable comments on an
earlier draft of this article. Any outstanding errors and
misapprehensions are the authors responsibility alone.
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2 Monetary developments since
1992
Nobody has ever pretended that the economic situ-
ation facing the Russian government when the
USSR collapsed at the end of 1991 was easy Faith
in central planning had collapsed and with the tem-
porary outlawing of the Communist Party, that sys-
tem's main political prop was removed.
Gorbachev's half-hearted reform efforts, undertaken
when his control over political events was decreas-
ing by the day, had removed much of the planning
structure without setting up new institutions in its
place. Inflation was rapid2 while, especially in major
cities, there were severe shortages of goods in the
shops. At the same time, the Russian government
had to learn how to govern after the fall of the USSR
(a difficult enough task in Moscow; but how much
more so in the other 14 capitals), while the close
economic integration of the USSR had been upset
by the sudden independence of 14 new states. All
this, while the government had to take the giant
leap in the dark of converting the economy from
central planning to a market system.
Russia's monetary situation at the time exhibited
two rather odd phenomena: a so-called monetary
overhang and the coexistenue of three different pric-
ing systems. The term 'monetary overhang describes
an accumulation of money in the population without
any immediate use for it, either for the purchase of
goods or for investment in savings instruments. The
surplus had slowly accrued since the 1970s but its
growth accelerated in 1991, in which year 'Moscow
printed more money than had been created during
the previous 30 years' (Hedlund & Sundstrom
1996: 893). As a result, by 1991 the overhang may
have accounted for as much as one third of financial
assets in the USSR (UNECE 1995: 190). Its very
existence is a clear indicator of the failure of central
planning, demonstrating as it did the inability of
potential demand (expressed in the ownership of
money) to stimulate supply to match it (the supply
of most products under central planning was possi-
ble only under government order). As was widely
recognised at the time, the combination of a mone-
tary overhang with severe shortages posed a great
risk of inflation when the time would come to lift
the countk's pervasive price controls.
2 Russian consumer price inflation over the calendar year 1991 amounted to 143.9 per cent (EBRD 1996: 203).
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The triple system of pricing in its turn indicated
that the former system of administered rouble
prices had already collapsed. As the first of the three
tiers, prices of nearly all goods and services within
the centrally planned system were administratively
determined and reflected social and other criteria as
well as economic ones. Most consumer goods prices
barely moved for 30 years after a currency reform in
1958. However, by the end of the Perestroika
period an increasing number of prices were deter-
mined by the market, resulting in rouble prices
which were often substantially higher than those
officially nominated under the plan. This created
the second tier. At the same time, loss of confidence
in the rouble led some products to be priced in US
dollars: in Moscow in 1992, it was commonplace to
be charged a dollar price for a meal that was 10
times higher than the rouble price demanded in
another restaurant nearby
In November 1991, Boris Yeltsin appointed the
young economist Yegor Gaidar as finance minister
and deputy prime minister and placed him in
charge of economic reform (in June 1992 he
became acting prime minister). A shock economic
reform and stabilisation plan was announced, to
start at the beginning of January 1992. The centre-
piece of this plan was the sudden freeing of most
prices from administrative constraint (Murrell,
1997: 95; UNECE 1992: 143). It was expected that
this would create a once-for-all inflation surge, and
it was accompanied both by increases in price for
those few basic goods which retained administered
prices and by an increase in wages and monetary
benefits for the population. Government expendi-
ture was to be firmly reined in to prevent inflation-
ary pressures from being further pumped up.
As much as to pilot the way to market-based eco-
nomic processes, this was an attempt to cut the
Gordian knot posed by the coincidence of severe
supply shortages with excess holdings of money
However, the resulting inflation was much sharper
than anticipated. Prices rose in January 1992 by
245 per cent and by March they had increased by
618 per cent, more than the government's 500 per
cent target for the whole year (UNECE 1993: 160,
162). In the words of one later analysis, 'Wilfully
unleashing inflation, in the hope that one will
subsequently be able to contain it, may be likened
to starting a controlled brush fire' (Hedlund &
Sundström 1996: 895).
By mid-year the governor of the Central Bank of
Russia was replaced and the new governor
embarked on a policy of easy credit for industry to
counter the effects of increased prices. Fiscal control
relaxed, and the state budget turned from a surplus
worth 1.4 per cent of GDP in the first quarter of
1992 to a deficit of 10.6 per cent of GDP in the sec-
ond (UNECE 1993: 163).
The attempt at a shock-therapy reform was virtually
over, but it had already had three devastating con-
sequences. Firstly, Russian consumer prices
increased by 2,318 per cent during 1992 (EBRD
1996: 203). Secondly, the monetary chaos led
enterprises to mark up debts against each other
when they could not pay their bills.4 Inter-enter-
prise arrears increased during the first quarter of
1992 from R40 billion to R75 1 billion (more than
twice the amount of credit issued by the banking
system), and further still to R3,100 billion during
the second quarter (UNECE 1993: 161, 163).
Gaidar had hoped that the monetary squeeze which
accompanied the initial price rises would lead to an
industrial shake-out in the form of bankruptcies
and worker lay-offs, as happens in the outside
world. But neither the economic institutions nor the
cultural traditions for those events existed in Russia.
Instead of cutting production, enterprises produced
for stock (even if they could not pay for inputs): dur-
ing 1992, inventories as a share of GDP rose by 16
percentage points (Kotz & Weir 1997: 181).
The third consequence was political: the rapid dis-
crediting of economic reform in the public's mind,
and with it also a discrediting of the democratic side
of politics. The problem of the monetary overhang
was removed, but only by virtue of the destruction
of most people's savings by inflation. After the ini-
tial price reform, commentators remarked on how
quickly the shops became filled with goods. But this
The figures cover all consolidated central and local
government expenditures and revenues. The EBRD
shows a deficit of 18.8 per cent of GDP for 1992 as a
whole, including extra-budgetary funds and unbudgeted
import subsidies (EBRD 1996: 203).
This seems to have taken the place of an increase in
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was as much because people could no longer afford
to buy them as because of any increase in supply
According to Murrell, 'The political backlash was
almost instantaneous'. In October 1991 the
Congress of People's Deputies voted 876 to 16 in
favour of Yeltsin's economic plan, but within two
weeks of the programme's start Ruslan Khasbulatov,
speaker of its main house, the Supreme Soviet,
called for the government's dismissal (Murrell
1997: 95-96; Kotz & Weir 1997: 167). Many con-
gress members turned against Yeltsin, sowing the
seeds of the confrontation which eventually led the
parliament to be stormed in the following year. In
December 1992 Gaidar resigned as acting prime
minister, to be replaced on a permanent basis by a
stolid industrialist, Victor Chernomyrdin.
Subsequent Russian macro-economic policy has
been dominated by the events of 1992. Firstly, a
restrictive monetary policy was eventually estab-
lished during 1993, and ïnflation came down
steadily to reach 22 per cent year-on-year by the
end of 1996 (Economist, 12 July 1997). This was
done partly under pressure from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), for which the success of
Russia's reforms was a very public test. Linked with
the anti-inflation policy, the rouble was made con-
vertible inside Russia (although it remains illegal to
take the currency out of the country), and its real
exchange rate steadily appreciated from the sharply
undervalued level of early 1992, when domestic
prices were about five per cent of world market lev-
els (UNECE 1992: 145). In the wake of a currency
crisis in October 1994, the Central Bank instituted
a managed float which allowed the rouble to fluctu-
ate within a band of values, declining from
4,300-4,900 per US dollar when instituted in July
1995 (Economist, 8 July 1995) to a level where a
new rouble could be launched at 6.1 (=6,100 old
roubles) per dollar in January 1998.
The other two main planks of Russia's economic
reforms over this period were the liberalisation of
international trade and a thoroughgoing
velocity of monetary circulation, which occurs more
usually in situations of extreme inflation (see section 3
below). This in itself probably indicates the different
role that money was locally understood to play in the
economy where central planning was invented. The
implications both for anti-inflationary strategy and
reform policy could have been better noted.
privatisation of both large industrial enterprises and
small retail and other firms (mostly through acqui-
sition by their workers and managers). The eco-
nomic consequences of these actions varied from
sector to sector. The liberalisation of trade made it
easier for producers of primary products such as oil,
gas and metals to place their output on world mar-
kets (although the currency received in payment
was not always brought home to Russia or placed
by managers at the enterprise's disposal). On the
other hand, it devastated many consumer goods
industries, which could not match the design, qual-
ity, prestige and sheer novelty value of the foreign
goods which suddenly appeared on the market.
While Russia's rushed privatisation found strong
international support, it often achieved little real
change in an enterprise beyond strengthening the
power (and increasing the control over resources) of
the director. The methods chosen generally failed to
put badly needed new capital into firms, which
were often insolvent and in desperate need of re-
equipment; while turning employees of overstaffed
companies into their shareholders made them all
the less likely to take urgent steps required to
increase labour productivity Overall, Russia's pri-
vatisation has been scarcely more successful at mak-
ing ex-Soviet enterprises respond effectively to
market signals than was the attempt at a shock-
therapy reform in 1992.
3 The economic failure of
stabilisation-based reform
Among the consequences of this approach to
Russia's transition from central planning were the
following five items, none of them positive:
a persistent budget deficit, which fuelled the
flames of inflation created by price liberalisation;
a sharp decline in the real stock of money in the
economy;
a continued general failure to undertake busi-
ness restructuring;
the growth of arrears of payments of all sorts,
even among privatised enterprises, and a crisis
in tax payments;
the continuing lack of development of the finan-
cial system, including banks.
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This section of the article discusses each of these
items in turn.
Although government spending was cut back
sharply to only 18 per cent of GDP by 1997, rev-
enues have declined even further, This has led to a
continuous three-cornered struggle over budget
deficits between the government, parliament (the
Duma) and the IMP Since 1993 the overall deficit
has fluctuated between about 5 and 10 per cent of
GDP; this has only increased the pressure to keep
monetary policy tight in the face of inflation. The
methods used to bring in taxes, under strong pres-
sure from the IMP, have often run counter to reform
requirements (this question is discussed in greater
detail below). Government bonds have been issued
in recent years to finance the deficit in a non-infla-
tionary way, and high interest rates have made them
a profitable investment for the banks; but develop-
ment of the bond market has been inhibited by the
shortage of liquidity
An examination of monetary statistics shows that
notwithstanding the monetary overhang, M2 broad
money supply (cash in circulation plus most bank
deposits, including those in foreign currencies) was
in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s no bigger in
relation to the size of the economy than is normal in
a developed market economy Broad money in the
USSR and its successor states amounted to R787. 1
billion on 1 January 1991 and Rl 422.2 billion on
1 January 1992, and on 1 July 1991, to R1,123.5
billion (UNECE 1992: 107). Russian GDP in 1991
is given as Rl 400 billion (EBRD 1996: 203) and in
1990 Russia is said to have accounted for 58.7 per
cent of the USSR's GDP (UNECE 1992: 137). If we
assume that that was also Russia's share of Soviet
money supply on 1 July 1991, the M2 figure then
comes to R659.5 billion, or 47.1 per cent of the
year's Russian GDP: a reasonable proxy for an exact
figure.
By way of comparison, most developed market
economies in recent years have had broad money
supplies in the range of 60-100 per cent of GDP In
Russia, however, the equivalent figure by 1995 was
11.6 per cent of GDP The figure was less than that
in only seven out of 118 other countries for which
it was given. Three of these (Azerbaijan, Belarus and
Moldova) were the only members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, other than
Russia, for which such a figure was given, and their
development since 1992 has closely mirrored that
of the USSR's formerly dominant republic. In three
of the other four (Cambodia, Sierra Leone and
Uganda), the state had disintegrated in civil vio-
lence during the 1980s or 1990s. (The seventh in
the list is Guinea.)
Another way of looking at the question is to con-
sider the actual value of money in circulation (that
is, after discounting inflation and irrespective of the
size of the economy). Kotz and Weir (1997: 171)
report that the real value of M2 broad money sup-
ply (taking only roubles into account) declined by
79 per cent in the first three months of 1992. The
UNECE (1994: 124) shows a decline of 81 per cent
in M2 (including foreign currencies) over 18
months to June 1993.
So it appears that until 1995 at least, rouble money
supply grew more slowly not only than prices but
also than nominal output. And there does not
appear to have been a compensating increase in
money's velocity of circulation:
Data on the changes in monetary and credit
aggregates ... show that the high dynamics of
consumer prices did not translate into an
increase in the velocity of circulation, which is
a typical development in an economy with high
inflation. This was partly caused by massive
non-payments and delayed payments, which in
turn were linked to the contraction of the real
money supply (UNECE 1994: 124)
This indicates that there arose instead a massive
shortage of liquidity in the economy, which still
continues. The domestic use of foreign currencies
(mainly US dollars) in lieu of roubles has compen-
sated for this in part; but the actual volume of trans-
actions is also greater than the GDP figures because
of the large informal sector.
As we have seen, the Gaidar government in early
1992 expected that the shock of a surge of inflation
accompanied by a monetary squeeze would lead
enterprises to cut back their output, reduce their
labour forces and, where they could not remain sol-
vent at all, go into liquidation, as happens in the
On this author's estimate, based on figures cited 1995 was 16.1 per cent of that in 1991.
above, the real value of rouble M2 money supply in
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outside world in such circumstances. To this day,
almost none of that has happened (except for the
cut in output). But although it has been reported
that 47 per cent of Russian companies traded at a
loss (Financial Times, 31 December 1997), bank-
ruptcy laws have scarcely been used to take insol-
vent companies out of the system. In the province
of Nïzhni Novgorod, for example, an analysis
showed that the large farming sector in aggregate
(which contained 775 farms at end-1996) was
insolvent according to Russian legal norms in each
year from 1993-96; its aggregate losses in 1996
amounted to almost US$ 100m. Yet in those years
only one farm in the province was declared bank-
rupt (Lines 1997).
Job losses and bankruptcies are of course not desir-
able outcomes in any circumstances. But without
them, the extreme difficulties of an inefficient econ-
omy facing a severe liquidity crisis can only fester
and grow worse. This is a necessary counterpart to
the development of management techniques which
are essential for survival on the market but were not
required under central planning, and which itself
has taken place only to a limited extent. What inter-
est will many managers see in altering their ways of
doing things if they think their firms will survive
anyway?
How have they performed the trick of making them
survive? The simple answer is by deciding which
bills they will pay and ignoring the rest (Kuznetsova
and Kuznetsov, 1996: 525). Firms often do not pay
for supplies that are delivered to them; but deliver-
ies continue to be made, a continuation of the phys-
ical input-output traditions of central planning.
There is no tradition, and only a little-tried mecha-
nism, for the enforcement of payments under con-
tract. Instead, most suppliers in turn decide which
of their creditors to honour and dishonour, and so
on down the line. Besides other firms, companies
fail to pay their employees' wages or the govern-
ment's taxes on time. As a result, 'even on conserv-
ative estimates, the stock of arrears ïn Russia at the
end of 1996 amounted to almost twice the stock of
total nominal broad money (domestic currency) in
the Russian economy' (UNECE 1997: 72). The gov-
ernment also, meanwhile, failing to receive its tax
revenues, delays payments on public-sector wages,
pensions and welfare benefits. Across the economy
as a whole, it was recently reported that 40 per cent
of the workforce had not received wages in the pre-
vious month (Financial Times, 26 November
1997).
Where companies are technically insolvent, or at
best highly illiquid, but still trading, they are likely
to avoid contracts that require monetary payments.
In Soviet times, there was a considerable amount of
informal bartering between enterprises in order to
overcome the supply shortfalls that were an
endemic feature of central planning; and interna-
tional trade between the Soviet-bloc countries, and
often also with countries outside the bloc, was con-
ducted on barter or countertrade terms. The devel-
opment of monetary relations under a market
economy might have been expected to put an end
to barter as a business instrument. But on the con-
trary, it has been estimated 'that barter rose as a pro-
portion of all industrial sales in Russia from about
10 per cent in mid-1993 to 40 per cent by the end
of 1996' (Economist, 15 March 1997, citing the
Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy).
In short, the most striking recent trend in the
Russian economy has been its demonetisation. Par
from giving root and flower to monetary relations,
the development of the market economy has been
accompanied by a steady withdrawal from them.
When one considers the central role that money,
and the price system built around it, have to play in
a market system, this appears bizarre and
unnerving.
The trend has been exacerbated by two other fail-
ures in the market reforms of recent years, in the
financial and fiscal arenas. In the USSR there were
effectively no banks as normally understood: that is
to say, no organisations that took deposits off one
group of customers and used their judgment to lend
the money on to others. Credits, in the sense of
loans which have to be paid back, scarcely existed.
Since 1990 thousands of organisations have been
set up in Russia with the name of banks (nearly
1,800 survived at the last count: Economist, 10
January 1998), but few of them actually are banks
in the normal sense of the word: they do not play
the role of financial intermediation just described.
In the years since 1992, they have found it more
profitable first to speculate on the currency market,
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and more recently to invest in government bonds.
The failure of banking to develop has been exacer-
bated by government tax policy, itself pursued in a
certain way at the behest of the IMP This policy has
also made the national liquidity crisis and demon-
etisation of the economy significantly worse. In the
Soviet Union, taxation of enterprises and individu-
als did not. exist as it does elsewhere; where indi-
viduals were taxed, it was by prior deductions by
employers from their pay packets, of which (unlike
the PAYE deductions of UK income tax) the
employees were not even aware (Cosman &
Rosenblum 1995). This was hardly a propitious set-
ting for complicated new imposts such as income
tax and value-added tax. In 1997, the government's
tax revenues amounted to just 10.8 per cent of GDP
(at most, one third of the level in developed market
economies), while its expenditures came to 18.3
per cent of GDP (Financial Times, 24 March
1998).
The IMP, looking as usual at the major macro-eco-
nomic indicators, has over a long period put pres-
sure on the Russian government to increase its tax
revenues. (From October 1997 to January 1998, a
US$ 700m tranche of IMP credit was suspended due
to dissatisfaction on this Count.) In response, the
government has instituted a harsh system of tax
police, who can visit enterprises at will to inspect
their accounts and confiscate money and liquid
assets to offset any tax liabilities deemed to have
been identified. The banks cooperate by permitting
the government to sequester funds from private
accounts for this purpose:
The tax inspectorate, the customs service, the
State Employment Service, and a number of
other agencies and regulatory bodies are enti-
tled to withdraw funds from the accounts of
legal andlor physical persons without their con-
sent. In many, if not most, cases, the right of the
administrative agency to withdraw the funds is
'uncontested' (besspornyi), meaning that it need
not seek the permission or approval of a court
or some other higher authority (Tompson
1997: 1,168.)
In extreme cases the authorities can, and often do,
freeze an enterprise's bank account: the enterprise is
then almost forced to resort to barter. These prac-
tices provide a powerful disincentive to use bank
accounts or hold liquid assets in any form, thereby
greatly reducing the efficiency of market transac-
tions. Where liquid assets are held, they are often
not officially declared. (It is considered normal for
Russian firms to keep two sets of accounts: one for
their own use, the other for the authorities).
Now, this has an extremely detrimental effect on the
development of banking: firms will hardly be will-
ing to deposit money in bank accounts if they know
that at any time the deposits might be seized by the
taxman. Of the banks generally, Tompson writes:
The functions performed by Russian banks
resemble those of their Soviet predecessors
more than those of banks in developed market
economies. During the Soviet period, banks
functioned as servants of the state rather than of
their clients: they served as organs of financial
control over client enterprises, as channels for
the allocation of state funds and as means of
mobilising domestic savings to finance the
states internal debt. What banks did not do in
the Soviet system was to bank, i.e. to interme-
diate funds. (Tompson 1997: 1,159-60.)
Yet the emphasis on tax collection at all costs
attacks only one aspect of a deeper malaise; and by
placing only the budget deficit in its sights, it risks
aggravating the liquidity squeeze and demonetisa-
tion. The present crisis can only be resolved by
tackling underlying failures of the transition, many
of them at the micro-economic level. The compet-
ing pressures on monetary and fiscal policy are
acute, leaving the government with almost as little
room for manoeuvre and facing as big a set of
dilemmas as when the reform process started in
1992.
In the present decade Russia and other countries of
the former Soviet Union have faced the most rapid
peacetime collapse in output of any major economy
in the history of industrialism: more rapid even
than the worst-hit econonies during the Great
Depression of the 1930s (Hedlund & Sundstrom
1996: 889). Russia's successive GDP growth rates
inthe six years from 1991 to 1996 were: minus 13.0
per cent (1991), minus 14.5 per cent, minus 8.7
per cent, minus 12.6 per cent, minus 4.0 per cent
and minus 6.0 per cent (1996). Russian GDP in
1996 was just 56.6 per cent of that of 1989 (EBRD
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1996: 203; UNECE 1997: 225). In part, no doubt,
the real monetary contraction was a consequence of
the decline in activity But the extreme extent of that
contraction was surely responsible for a good part
of the decline: we have just observed some of the
channels through which its contribution was made.
4 Russian money and the
transition
Russia's transition since 1992 has rested on three
main lines of policy: macro-economic (monetary)
stabilisation, the liberalisation of prices and trade,
and the privatisation of productive assets by trans-
fer of ownership to insiders. This article does not
argue that any of these in itself was undesirable;
they, or something like them, would all have been
essential parts of any policy of transition from cen-
tral planning. The argument is over the way in
which these policies were conducted, and what was
omitted in the process.
This can be elucidated by a brief examination of a
problem we alluded to earlier: the monetary over-
hang of the early 1990s. As we have seen, when
compared with other industrial economies, the total
money stock at that time appears to have been far
from excessive in relation to GDP. But a closer
examination suggests that the monetary overhang
was in fact an overhang of cash alone; the other
component of broad money, bank deposits, was
almost certainly very small. Thus, in 1994 currency
in circulation in 13 ex-Soviet countries amounted
to 8 per cent of GDP, compared with 6 per cent in
18 member countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development. Bank
deposits in the former, however, amounted to only
12 per cent of GDP, compared with 67 per cent in
the OECD countries (World Bank 1996: 101). A
relatively small volume of deposits was to be
expected in an economy emerging from central
planning, since neither bank deposits nor credit
played an important part in the functioning of that
system, as they do in a market economy (The
equivalent figures in 10 countries of East and
Central Europe were comparable: currency at 17
per cent of GDP and deposits at 25 per cent.)
Now it seems reasonable to suppose that the ratio
of cash to deposits was similar in 1991 to what was
reported three years later (i.e. 2:3, compared with
about 1:11 in OECD countries). On that basis, the
estimated M2 money stock in 1991 would have
broken down as roughly worth 19 per cent of GDP
in cash and 28 per cent of GDP in deposits. A more
rational policy to deal with such a large cash over-
hang would have been to encourage the holders of
cash to deposit it in bank accounts, where it could
have financed credit for working capital and invest-
ment, as savings normally do in a market economy
Put another way, the way to right the monetary
overhang would have been by encouraging the
delopment of the institutions of a market econ-
omy, not by the crude tools of inflation and mone-
tary suppression.
A monetarists description of the monetary over-
hang is as a form of repressed inflation. The over-
hang represented potential demand in a situation of
endemic shortages; if prices ceased to be controlled
by administrative fiat, the inevitable result would be
inflation, As we have seen, this is just what hap-
pened. But paradoxically, although the overhang
was destroyed, the shortage of liquidity which suc-
ceeded it also represents repressed inflation
(UNECE 1997: 72). In 1992, the underlying cause
of repressed inflation lay in the failure under central
planning to provide adequate supplies of goods and
services, coupled with administrative prices. Now it
is the insufficient supply of money that is keeping
inflation down. Actual payments have been
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